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MEMO TO THE PARTNER 
PROPOSED EARNOUT AGREEMENT PROVISIONS 
ELIZABETH A. CLIPPARD* 
TO:   Law Office Partner 
FROM:  Associate 
RE:   Proposed Earnout Agreement Provisions 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 Attached are proposed terms and provisions to be inserted into 
the current draft of our Earnout Agreement (the “Earnout”) between 
our client, McClelland & Sons, LLC (“McClelland”) and Private Prisons, 
Inc. Executed simultaneously with the Asset Purchase Agreement at 
closing, the Earnout will allow our client to realize a more accurate 
purchase price based upon the client’s valuations, provided that it can 
come to an agreement with state leaders and finalize an additional long-
term government contract. 
 In the Rider attached to this memorandum, I have drafted the 
terms of the payment to be made post-closing in the earnout period. I 
have also contemplated necessary limitations on the rights under this 
agreement, post-closing covenants, and dispute resolution provisions 
based on drafting norms in similar transactions. The remainder of this 
memorandum sets forth the pertinent facts and the driving factors for 
each party to the transaction, addresses the legal issues we face in making 
drafting decisions, and expresses my rationale for the proposed solutions 
represented in the attached Rider A. 
II.        TRANSACTIONAL CONTEXT 
Our law firm was recently retained to advise McClelland and 
their representatives on the sale of their family business. McClelland is a 
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closely held limited liability company organized under Tennessee law. It 
owns and operates a number of large private prison facilities across 
Tennessee, its largest customers being the State of Tennessee and the 
State of Kentucky. It is my understanding that McClelland is run 
primarily by the children and grandchildren of the founding family 
members. The third generation of the family business is no longer 
interested in managing the business in the long term, and their working 
relationships are not as amicable as those of the previous two 
generations. As the second generation leaders of the company are aging, 
they feel that their best option is to sell the company while it is still a 
profitable business and allow the family to pursue other ventures with 
the proceeds. 
The McClellands have received many offers to purchase their 
business over the years, but only from one company, Private Prisons, 
Inc. (“PPI”). PPI is a large corporation incorporated in Delaware that 
owns private prison facilities in 12 states (largely in the Northeast and 
Midwest). It has been interested in acquiring McClelland’s facilities as a 
way to enter into the southeastern market. This acquisition will give PPI 
its first facility in this area, and together with McClelland’s existing 
government contracts and goodwill, will bring further value to PPI’s 
expansion into the Southeast. Thus, the parties have entered into a non-
disclosure agreement with our client to facilitate further discussions on 
the potential acquisition. 
In negotiations, McClelland and PPI have not been able to agree 
on a valuation of McClelland. PPI valued McClelland at $20 million 
without taking into consideration the potential cost of adding new states 
as clients and the reasonable projected cost of expansion on the current 
property. McClelland believes it is worth $30-35 million with the high 
likelihood that negotiations with the State of South Carolina will close 
within the year.  Recently, other surrounding states have made inquiries 
into using McClelland as a contractor. McClelland contends that its 
spotless reputation in the Southeast and potential to win additional 
government contracts from surrounding states is worth a great deal in 
addition to its extensive physical assets. PPI’s position is that McClelland 
has had plenty of opportunities to seize additional state contracts, but 
has failed to do so because of limited space and aversion to expanding. 
Its valuation gives little weight to goodwill and potential new clients; it 
also takes into account necessary renovation and expansion costs. Thus, 
the gap between the parties’ valuations is significant and unlikely to be 
closed in negotiations without the drafting of an Earnout. 
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Before sale of the business was broached, McClelland’s leaders 
began negotiations with the State of South Carolina to accept hundreds 
of new inmates from overcrowded South Carolina prisons. If the 
agreement is completed, McClelland could see a drastic increase in 
revenue over the next ten years with multiple options to renew. PPI is 
not willing to take this transaction into consideration in its valuation 
because this opportunity has previously come up for McClelland and 
fallen through before a final agreement could be reached. PPI has 
agreed, however, to negotiate an Earnout Agreement in conjunction with 
the Asset Purchase Agreement, so as to value the company with the 
contract only if the government contract comes to fruition within the 
agreed upon term of the Earnout Agreement. 
McClelland has only one class of common stock held by 10 
family members spanning three generations. It has no major outstanding 
debt other than short-term liabilities incurred in the ordinary day-to-day 
operations of the prison facility. It is duly organized as a member-
managed LLC under the predecessor Tennessee Limited Liability 
Company Act and has not opted into the new Tennessee Limited 
Liability Company Act. 1  Under T.C.A. § 48-244-201(b), a member-
managed LLC, after notice has been given to all members, voting and 
nonvoting, may sell all or substantially all of its assets not in the regular 
course of business upon a majority vote in favor of the sale by the 
members present at a duly called and held meeting.2 The McClelland 
family recently called a special meeting of all members in order to vote 
on the proposed sale of the business. All 10 members attended and 
voted unanimously for the sale of the business and agreed upon the 
earnout mechanism as the best way to handle a disagreement over 
valuation. We have advised the company that under McClelland’s 
operational documents a sale of substantially all of the firm’s assets is an 
event of dissolution. McClelland’s Charter states that in the event of 
such a sale, the company is to file a notice of dissolution within a 
reasonable period of time after closing and distribute assets to the 
members. We will be advising the firm through this process as well. A 
notice of dissolution will be filed with the Secretary of State as soon as 
                                                        
1 T.C.A. §§ 48-203-101 and 102 require that a person or persons file with the Secretary 
of State articles of the LLC for the purpose of any lawful business. TENN. CODE ANN. 
§§ 48-203-101, -102 (West 2014). 
2 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-244-201(b) (West 2014). 
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practicably possible after closing, and McClelland will be wound up and 
assets distributed to the members according to procedures set out in 
T.C.A. § 48-245-1101.3 
PPI is a publicly traded corporation with only one class of 
authorized common stock and one class of authorized preferred stock 
held by key insiders. PPI’s officers have assured us that PPI is duly 
organized under the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware4 
and that it has the specific power to purchase assets in the ordinary 
course of business without shareholder approval.5 PPI has additionally 
agreed to concede the choice of law provision in favor of our clients. In 
both the Asset Purchase Agreement and the Earnout, Tennessee law will 
govern all disputes and contract interpretation, and the choice of venue 
for dispute resolution will be Nashville, Tennessee.6 
III.        KEY SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES 
The most important assurance that we need to give to our client 
in this transaction is that it will be able to continue negotiations with 
South Carolina in the same manner it was able to conduct those 
negotiations before the acquisition, so that it may receive some or all of 
the earnout payment. If PPI were to thwart McClelland’s efforts or 
drastically change the operations of the business so as to turn the 
                                                        
3 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-244-1101 (West 2014). 
4 Delaware General Corporate Law (“DGCL”) §101 requires that a person or entity 
incorporate to conduct any lawful business or purposes by “filing with the Division of 
Corporations in the Department of State a certificate of incorporation which shall be 
executed, acknowledged and filed in accordance with § 103 of this title.” DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 8, § 101 (West 2014). 
5 DGCL § 122(4) states that “[e]very corporation created under this chapter shall have 
the power to: [p]urchase, receive, take by grant, gift, devise, bequest or otherwise, lease, 
or otherwise acquire, own, hold, improve, employ, use and otherwise deal in and with 
real or personal property, or any interest therein, wherever situated, and to sell, convey, 
lease, exchange, transfer or otherwise dispose of, or mortgage or pledge, all or any of its 
property and assets, or any interest therein, wherever situated.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, 
§ 122 (West 2014). 
6 We anticipate that the parties will agree on an alternative dispute resolution provision 
to be contained in the Asset Purchase Agreement. Venue for such negotiations, 
mediations, and arbitrations will be in Nashville, Tennessee, at the principal offices of 
McClelland. In the event that a dispute cannot be resolved outside of litigation, 
proceedings will be held in the appropriate court of Davidson County, Nashville, 
Tennessee. 
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prospective client away, McClelland could lose its opportunity to obtain 
the additional contingent portion of the purchase price provided for in 
the Earnout Agreement. PPI could do this innocently in an attempt to 
maximize profits while integrating McClelland’s business into its current 
operations, or it could purposefully attempt to poison the contract 
negotiations in order to avoid making the earnout payment.7 Thus, it is in 
our client’s best interest to include provisions allowing key employees to 
remain integrated in the operations of the business uninterrupted and 
compelling the cooperation of the leaders at PPI throughout the term of 
the earnout period. In order to give our client this assurance, I have 
included in Rider A terms for post-closing operation of McClelland’s 
business and the cooperation of the acquiring company.  The provision 
incorporates language promising commercially reasonable efforts to aid 
key employees and prohibiting any bad faith efforts to render 
McClelland an unattractive provider of services. 
Another important consideration is dispute resolution. Detailed 
alternative dispute resolution terms are common in earnout agreements 
that are based on a determination of financial benchmarks.8 Where an 
earnout employs financial benchmarks, such as operating margin or 
revenue, for example, parties often dispute the manner in which such 
financials were calculated. To avoid such disputes, it is important for 
these parties to agree to detailed dispute resolution procedures, which 
often include neutral third parties to audit the acquired firm’s financials. 
Payment under our proposed Earnout provisions hinge on the 
occurrence of a non-financial benchmark. McClelland will be aiming to 
execute an agreement with a new client based on certain minimum 
contract numbers. Thus, while this Earnout may be less susceptible to 
disputes, it is likely that either party will have objections as to the 
performance of the other under this agreement. Our client has made 
                                                        
7  Taking into consideration that a court may imply good faith and fair dealing 
provisions even if they are not explicitly addressed in the agreement. See Horizon 
Holdings, LLC v. Genmar Holdings, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1257-58 (D. Kan. 
2003) (holding that the earnout payment was part of the purchase price and it was 
implied that the target company would be allowed the fair opportunity to operate the 
company in a way to maximize their earnout potential). 
8 ABA PUBL’G, The 18th Annual National Institute on Negotiating Business Acquisitions, Section 
J: Purchase Price Adjustments, Earnouts and Other Purchase Price Provisions, in NEGOTIATING 
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 2013, F-37 to F-45 (2013), available at 
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/3831754280. 
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clear that it does not want to end up in litigation with PPI over the 
contingent portion of the purchase price given PPI’s size and strength. 
For this reason, I have included in Rider A a good faith negotiations 
requirement and, if that is not successful, binding arbitration with costs 
to be split equally between the parties. Binding arbitration with costs 
split equally is a recognized norm in earnout agreements in relation to 
the sale of a business.9 
Finally, the right to future payment contingent upon the 
satisfaction of a few conditions has attributes similar to those of a 
security, and neither party to this transaction would like to register the 
offer or sale of this right to payment with the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”). The SEC has issued a series of no-
action letters on this issue that identify elements distinguishing a right 
under an earnout agreement from a security regulated under federal and 
state securities law.10 I have included a “No Assignment” provision in 
the Earnout to help ensure that the rights under the Earnout Agreement 
do not fall within the realm of securities regulation. 
IV. ANALYSIS OF MAJOR DRAFTING DECISIONS 
To begin Rider A, I have drafted the most important provision 
of the Earnout, the earnout payment. The lump cash sum to become 
payable upon the effectiveness of the contract between McClelland and 
the State of South Carolina is $5,000,000.11  This amount reflects the 
agreed-upon increase in value due to the revenue stream the contract will 
supply, as well as the enhanced prospect of attracting additional 
government clients. The difference between PPI and McClelland’s 
valuations was more than $5,000,000; however, our client was willing to 
keep this number lower in order to gain cooperation in all other terms of 
                                                        
9 Id. at F-56. (Arbitration is the norm. Parties often split the costs associated with 
arbitration, but they also may let the losing party bear all costs). 
10 See Great Western Financial Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1983 WL 28156 (Apr. 14, 
1983); Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1983 WL 
30832 (Mar. 3, 1983); Lifemark Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1981 WL 25420 (Nov. 
17, 1981); and Kaiser Aetna, SEC No-Action Letter, 1973 WL 9661 (July 30, 1973). 
11 I chose an all-cash payment over a stock payment or a combined stock and cash 
payment because it makes the right to payment more clearly fall outside the definition 
of a security (to be discussed further below). Our client’s shareholders have also 
expressed the desire to deal exclusively in cash consideration due to their anticipated 
dissolution after closing and their desire to seize new investment opportunities. 
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the Earnout,i.e., choice of law, dispute resolution, post-closing 
cooperation, and term. This language was modeled after a precedent 
document in a similar transaction employing a similar non-financial 
payment trigger.12 The contract to be executed with the State of South 
Carolina must meet certain minimums in order to trigger PPI’s 
obligation to make the earnout payment. McClelland and the State of 
South Carolina must agree to a “long-term” contract to exceed [  ] years, 
and the contract must provide for at least $[  ] amount in income per 
year.13 As long as the contract reaches these two parameters, PPI will be 
obligated to pay the additional portion of the purchase price under the 
Earnout. 
 The three remaining provisions represent our client’s biggest 
concerns in entering into this agreement. The next few paragraphs of 
this memorandum address the principal decisions made in drafting those 
sections in the order in which the relevant text appears in the Rider.  
 First, because the trigger for the earnout payment is the 
effectuation of a contract between McClelland and the State of South 
Carolina, our client needs to be assured that it will be able to continue 
working in the ordinary course of business toward the definitive 
agreement between McClelland and the State of South Carolina.  This 
will require support from and the cooperation of PPI.  Accordingly, the 
post-closing cooperation provision is designed to cover three things: (1) 
McClelland’s key employees’ primary control and involvement in 
continued negotiations, (2) PPI’s obligation to act in good faith, and (3) 
PPI’s commitment to exerting commercially reasonable efforts to aid 
McClelland’s employees in reaching a Definitive Agreement, as defined 
in Rider A. The phrase “commercially reasonable efforts” has long been 
a subject of litigation in mergers and acquisitions. In general, 
“commercially reasonable efforts” is a less onerous standard than those 
clauses that utilize “best efforts.”14 I chose to include this standard so 
that PPI would feel that it is able to operate its newly integrated business 
                                                        
12  Language initially modeled after Section 4.1.2, which details the portion of the 
purchase price contingent on non-financial milestones. UniTek Global Servs., Inc., 
Asset Purchase Agreement, (Ex. 2.1, Form 8-K) (Sept. 12, 2012). 
13  The minimum term and price of contract between PPI and the State of South 
Carolina is to be determined by the parties at the final stage of negotiation. 
14 Earn-outs, PRAC. LAW CORP. & SEC., Practice Note 0-500-1650. (Aug. 2014). 
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in the way it best sees fit, so long as that process does not substantially 
interfere with the goal McClelland’s employees have of selling that 
process to a large government client. 
Second, I have drafted an alternative dispute resolution provision 
to better ensure that our client does not end up in a lengthy and 
expensive litigation situation. Although most earnout agreements include 
detailed dispute resolution provisions in order to resolve any financial 
and accounting discrepancies by independent parties, we want to ensure 
our client will be paid under the Earnout Agreement without 
unnecessary objections from PPI about the contents of the Definitive 
Agreement. For this reason, I have tailored the language to require a 30-
day negotiation period, and if that is not successful, binding arbitration. 
From my research, binding arbitration is a norm in earnout agreements,15 
and it is also the preference of our client. In order to ensure an unbiased 
proceeding and prevent any undue influence from PPI, I included 
procedure for selecting the three arbitrators, adherence to the standard 
AAA rules, and our client’s preferred venue. 
 Finally, both parties to this transaction are adamant that the 
Earnout Agreement in conjunction with the Asset Purchase Agreement 
be drafted in a manner to avoid all federal securities regulations. Section 
2(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, defines “security” broadly 
to include notes, stock, investment contracts, certificates of interest in a 
profit-sharing agreement, evidence of indebtedness, security futures, 
among other rights to payment.16 Under the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Howey, an “investment contract” is “a contract or scheme for ‘the placing 
of capital or laying out of money in a way intended to secure income or 
profit from its employment.”17 Otherwise stated, the term includes any 
situation where a person or firm was led to invest money and expect 
profits solely from the efforts of others.18 Because the right to future 
payment under earnout agreements could be construed to fit within this 
definition, the SEC has issued a series of no-action letters offering a 
                                                        
15 See NuPathe Inc., Contingent Cash Consideration Agreement (Ex. 99.1, Form8-K) 
(Dec. 16, 2013) (labeling Section 22 as “Negotiation; Arbitration.”); Alcoa Inc., Earnout 
Agreement (Ex. 10.1, Form 8-K) (June 27, 2014) (labeling Section 7.10 as 
“Arbitration”). 
16 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 77b (West 2012). 
17 SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946). 
18 Id. 
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limited regulatory safe harbor for this type of transaction and payment 
structure. The SEC should not bring action on this limited basis. The 
letters may or may not prevent a claim that the earnout is a security; 
however, courts tend to give no-action letters the effect of regulations. 
The SEC has stated that the following factors demonstrate that a 
particular earnout agreement should not be considered a security and 
thus will not necessitate registration: 
[1] The earnout right was granted to the sellers as part of 
the consideration for the sale of their business and neither 
the buyers nor the sellers viewed the right as involving an 
“investment” by the sellers; [2] The earnout right did not 
represent an ownership interest in the buyer and was not 
evidenced by any certificates; [3] The earnout right could 
not be transferred except by operation of law; [4] The 
earnout right did not entitle the owner to voting or 
dividend rights.19 
The Asset Purchase Agreement will specifically reference that the 
earnout payment is a portion of the consideration for the purchased 
assets and that the acquisition will result in the winding up of the 
McClelland business. Thus, the right to the earnout payment cannot be 
construed as an investment in an ongoing business, as it will cease to 
exist. The earnout is a right to a lump-sum cash payment.  No portion of 
the consideration paid to McClelland will consist of PPI stock.  Thus, 
McClelland will not acquire any ownership interest, voting, or dividend 
rights in PPI as a result of this transaction. Finally, the right to the 
earnout payment cannot be transferred except by operation of law. To 
restrict transfer of McClelland’s right to the earnout payment, I have 
included in Rider A a specific “No Assignment” provision prohibiting 
McClelland from transferring its interests under the Earnout Agreement 
unless done by operation of law or as a transfer of their membership 
                                                        
19 ABA PUBL’G, supra note 8, at F-58 (citing to the following SEC no-action letters: 
Great Western Financial Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1983 WL 28156 (Apr. 14, 
1983); Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1983 WL 
30832 (Mar. 3, 1983); Lifemark Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1981 WL 25420 (Nov. 
17, 1981); and Kaiser Aetna, SEC No-Action Letter, 1973 WL 9661 (July 30, 1973)). 
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interest in the winding up of McClelland.20 This drafting should allow the 
parties to avoid the application of federal securities regulation, including 
the need to register the offer and sale of the earnout right. 
V. MINOR DRAFTING DECISIONS 
Below are some of the less significant drafting choices I made in 
drafting the provisions included in the Rider: 
 By defining in section one the minimum parameters of the contract 
with the State of South Carolina, I attempted to manage PPI’s 
expectations for the contract, so that the payment cannot be delayed 
by an objection to the ultimate quality of the agreement. 
 In section two, I gave McClelland sole discretion in proceeding in 
negotiations with the State of South Carolina. I believe this is the 
most clear-cut way to set out who will be responsible for executing 
the definitive agreement. In opting not to use the term “cooperation,” 
I hope to give McClelland more control post-closing over the 
earnout’s success or failure. PPI’s directors and officers will have 
reasonable access to information on the progress of negotiations and 
will be allowed to exercise oversight to the extent that is required by 
law or corporate governance rules elected in the organizational 
documents. 
 In section two, I chose to use the phrase “unduly burden” to qualify 
the exercise of discretion by McClelland in negotiating the final terms 
of the contract with the State of South Carolina. I think it is unlikely 
PPI would agree to the “sole discretion” standard if it were not 
modified by this covenant. Taken together, the sole discretion 
standard and the undue burden limitation give each party what it 
desires: control in its own area of expertise. 
 
 
 
                                                        
20 I have contemplated that our client’s members may wish to transfer all or a portion 
of their membership interest to another family member before a large distribution for 
preferable tax treatment. 
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RIDER A 
EARNOUT AGREEMENT BETWEEN 
MCCLELLAND & SONS, LLC AND PRIVATE PRISONS, INC. 
1. Earnout Payment. PPI shall pay to McClelland as additional 
consideration for the Purchased Assets under the Purchase 
Agreement a total of $5,000,000 in cash (the “Earnout Payment”), 
which amount shall become payable upon the occurrence of the 
following conditions: (i) PPI in conjunction with McClelland’s 
representatives come to a final agreement in writing with the State of 
South Carolina (the “State”) for the use of the Acquired Business’s 
services (the “Definitive Agreement”); (ii) the Definitive 
Agreement shall have an initial term of not less than ten years 
including any renewal periods; and (iii) the Definitive Agreement 
shall generate at least $1,000,000 in income per year during its initial 
term. For the purposes of this section, “income” shall mean all 
consideration paid by the State to PPI for the services rendered by 
the Acquired Business and shall not take into account any 
deductions, expenses, set offs, or costs. 
2. Post-Closing Covenants. Subject to the terms of this Agreement 
and the Purchase Agreement, subsequent to the Closing, 
McClelland’s representatives shall have primary control with regards 
to matters relating to the negotiation of the Definitive Agreement as 
long as McClelland’s discretion does not unduly burden PPI in 
operating the Acquired Business in a commercially reasonable 
manner. PPI shall not, directly or indirectly, take any actions in bad 
faith that would have the purpose of avoiding the Earnout Payment 
provided for in this Agreement. And further, PPI shall use, and shall 
cause its respective officers, managers and employees to use, 
commercially reasonable efforts to aid McClelland’s representatives 
in finalizing the Definitive Agreement.21 
3. Negotiation, Arbitration. (a) Prior to any arbitration, all parties to 
this agreement shall agree to negotiate in good faith for a period of 
30 days to resolve any controversy or claim arising out of or relating 
                                                        
21 See Alcoa Inc., Earnout Agreement (Ex. 10.1, Form 8-K) (June 27, 2014) (modeling 
last sentence after language found in Section 2.4). 
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to this Agreement, including the alleged breach of this Agreement.22 
(b) After the expiration of the 30-day period, any controversy or 
claim arising out of or relating to this Agreement, including any 
alleged breach of this Agreement, shall be settled by binding 
arbitration administered by the American Arbitration Association 
under its Commercial Arbitration Rules. The number of arbitrators 
shall be three. PPI and McClelland shall each select one person 
experienced in mergers and acquisitions to act as arbitrator. The two 
selected arbitrators shall select a third similarly experienced person to 
act as arbitrator. The location of the arbitration shall be Nashville, 
Tennessee. The written opinion of the arbitrators shall be delivered 
within 180 days of the commencement of arbitration. All fees and 
expenses incurred in relation to any arbitration, including the costs 
and expenses billed by the arbitrators, shall be paid by both parties in 
equal parts.23 
4. No Assignment. The right to payment under this Agreement shall 
not be sold, assigned, transferred, pledged, encumbered, or in any 
other manner transferred or disposed of, in whole or in part, other 
than through a Permitted Transfer.  A Permitted Transfer includes 
(a) a transfer of any or all of the membership interests and right to 
distributions by McClelland in the winding up of the business upon 
death, by will or intestacy, by gift or other estate planning purposes; 
(b) a transfer made under the order of a court with competent 
jurisdiction (such as in connection with divorce, bankruptcy or 
liquidation); or (c) a transfer made by operation of law.24 
                                                        
22 See NuPathe Inc., Contingent Cash Consideration Agreement (Ex. 99.1, Form 8-K) 
(Dec.16, 2013) (modeling language after Section 22(a)). 
23 Id. at § 22(b). 
24  Id. at § 5. 
